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COMMENTARY

Self-Determination: Chechnya,
Kosovo, and East Timor
JonathanI. Charney*
Hindsight always appears better than foresight. Hopefully, the
reexamination of past events will provide lessons for the future.
Recent media reports have analyzed the genocide in Rwanda and
blamed France, the United States, and the UN Security Council for
their failures to take steps that might have prevented or stopped the
atrocities.'
Academic studies also argue how the atrocities in
Chechnya, Kosovo, and East Timor may have been prevented or
stopped by the United Nations or others in the international
community. 2
Such analyses are for international relations
authorities and military experts. As an international lawyer, I am
reluctant to tread in those domains. For me, the question is whether
changes in international law might modify the behavior of major
international actors such as states, intergovernmental organizations,
and nongovernmental organizations. In the future they might be
better prepared if situations like Chechnya, Kosovo, or East Timor
were to arise. Certainly, there is no lack of international law
condemning the atrocities that took place in those territories. The
existence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia (ICTY)-with authority to prosecute persons who
committed international crimes in Kosovo-did not appear to deter
Slobodan Milosevic and his supporters in their drive to crush the

* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University Law School. Research assistance was
provided by Sylwia Lis, J.D. expected 2001; Witold Lis, J.D. expected 2001; and Emily
Kalovidouris, J.D. expected 2002.
1.
Barbara Crossette, Report Says U.S. and Others Allowed Rwanda
Genocide, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2000, at A4.
2.
See generally Thomas D. Grant, Extending Decolonization: How the United
Nations Might Have Addressed Kosovo, 28 GA. J. INI"L & CO.MP. L. 9 (1999); Gail W.
Lapidus, Contested Sovereignty. The Tragedy of Chechnya, INT'L SECURITY, Summer
1998, at 5; Paul C. Szasz, The Irresistible Force of Self-Determinatwn Meets the
Impregnable Fortressof TerritorialIntegrity." A Cautionary Fairy Tale About Clashes
in Kosovo and Elsewhere, 28 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1 (1999).
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Kosovo independence movement and ethnically cleanse the region. 3
No international criminal tribunal had jurisdiction over the Russian
actions in Chechnya. While some hope that the establishment of the
permanent International Criminal Court (ICC)4 will deter the
commission of international crimes, its efficacy remains unproven.
Samuel Huntington might chalk these events up to the inevitable
clashes of civilizations during the "multipolar and multicivilizational"
period he argues we have entered. 5 While fate may be on the side of
continuing and escalating conflicts of this nature, it is incumbent
upon us to seek ways to minimize or eliminate recurrences of these
events anywhere in the world.
Chechnya and Kosovo have many parallels. Not only did the
events take place in the same general time frame but both involved
ethnic minorities seeking a degree of autonomy or independence from
relatively non-democratic and dictatorial regimes. 6 East Timor,
albeit slightly different, provides interesting similarities.
At the legal heart of these matters is the law of selfdetermination. In its classical incarnation after the establishment of
the United Nations, self-determination seemed to be only the vehicle

3.
See International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for
Serious Violations of InternationalHumanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of
the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, in Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to
Paragraph2 of the Security Council Resolution 808, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., Annex,
U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1163, 1192 (1993) [hereinafter ICTY
Statute]. In fact, the ICTY Prosecutor considered that the ICTY had jurisdiction over
international crimes committed in Kosovo during the period of the NATO actions and
investigated whether NATO had committed such violations. Final Report to the
Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign
Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (June 13,
2000),
at
http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/nato0613OO.htm
(last visited Feb. 3, 2001);
Introductory Statement by Justice Louise Arbour, Prosecutor ICTY and ICTR at the
Launch of the ICC Coalition's Global Ratification Campaign, The Hague Appeal for
Peace,
May
13,
1999,
ICTY
Press
Release
JLIPIU/401-E,
at
http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/p4Ol-e.htm (last visited Feb. 3, 2001).
The
jurisdiction of the ICTY includes "violations of international humanitarian law
committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991.
ICTY Statute,
supra,art. 1, at 1192.
4.
United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (July 17, 1998) (as corrected by the procbs.
verbaux of Nov. 10, 1998 and July 12, 1999), available at http://www.un.orgllaw/iccl
statute/romefra.htm [hereinafter ICC Statute]. For the uncorrected version, see
United Nations, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 37 I.L.M. 999
(1998).
5.
SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING
OF WORLD ORDER 19-29 (1996).

6.

For chronologies of the conflicts in Kosovo and Chechnya, see, respectively,

JULIE A. MERTUS, KOSOVO: How MYTHS AND TRUTHS STARTED A WAR 285-309 (1999);

Lapidus, supra note 2, at 15-24.
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7
for decolonization, resulting in a multitude of independent states.
More difficult is the arguable application of this doctrine to the post
colonial period. 8 Some argue that it has no application outside of
decolonization.
Others argue that it may, but does not permit
secession from an established state outside of the colonial context. 9
These authorities and others might recognize so-called internal selfdetermination that would allow a minority group the protection of
group rights and certain autonomy within the established state but
no right of secession.10 At the far other extreme, it might be argued
that a territorially-centered coherent group has the inherent right to
decide for itself whether to remain part of the state in which it is
located or to choose independent statehood. Debates have raged
among international lawyers and diplomats over the right of selfdetermination in the non-colonialist context. One might even argue

7.
See U.N. CHARTER arts. 1. 55; American Convention on Human Rights.
Nov. 22, 1969, arts. 33, 52-73, O.A.S. Treaty Series No. 36, O.A.S. Official Records
OEA/Ser. A/16, reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 673 (1970): International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, art. 1. 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 173; International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art. 1, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 5; Western
Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 12 (Oct. 16); MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OFTHE UNITED STATES
TRANSMITTING FOUR TREATIES PERTAINING TO HUMAN RIGHTS. S. E.XEC. Docs. C. D, E.
F, No. 95-2 (1978); Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly
Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28. Annex, at 121,
U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1971) [hereinafter Declaration on Friendly Relations]; Declaration
on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, G.A. Res. 1514,
U.N.GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, paras. 2, 6, U.N. Doc. A14684 (1961).
8.
See generally LEE C. BUCHHEIT, SECESSION: THE LEGITIMACY OF SELFDETERMINATION (1978); Kwaw Nyameke Blay, Self-Determination Versus Territorial
Integrity in DecolonizationRevisited, 25 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 386 (1985); Deborah Z. Cass,
Re-Thinking Self-Determination: A Critical Analysis of Current International Law
Theories, 18 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 21 (1992); Lung-Chu Chen, SelfDetermination and World Public Order, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1287 (1991); Kate
Greene, InternationalResponses to Secessionist Conflicts, 90 AM. SOC'Y INTL L PROC.
296 (1996); Hurst Hannum, The Right of Self-Determination in the Twenty-First
Century, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 773, 776-77 (1998); Gerry J. Simpson, The Diffusion
of Sovereignty: Self-Determination in the Postcolonial Age. 32 STAN. J. IN'rL L 255
(1996).
9.
E.g., James Crawford, State Practiceand InternationalLau, in Relation to
Unilateral Secession, in SELF-DETEMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: QUEBEC AND
LESSONS LEARNED paras. 10, 63-67, at 31, 36, 59-60 (Anne F. Bayefsky ed., 2000),
available at
http'Jlcanada.justice.gc.calenlnewslnr/1997factunifcraw.html
flast
modified Dec. 9, 1997); Rupert Emerson, Self-Determination, 65 AM. J. INTL L. 459.
465 (1971); Hannum, supra note 8, at 776-77; Diane F. Orentlicher, Separation
Anxiety: InternationalResponses to Ethno-Separatist Claims, 23 YALE J. INT'L L 1, 4
(1998).
10.
E.g., Crawford, supra note 9, para. 62, at 58; Thomas M. Franck, The
EmergingRight to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 46, 59 (1992); Thomas D.
Grant, A Panel of Experts for Chechnyo: Purposes and Prospects in Light of
InternationalLaw, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 115, 180 (1999); Hurst Hannum, Rethinking Self.
Determination,34 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 66-69 (1993).
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that this uncertainty has itself contributed to many human tragedies
the world has witnessed in the post-World War II period by giving
false hope to minority groups that they have rights to autonomy or
independence against the states in which they are found, even absent
a colonial history. That assertion may fail to take into account the
many other factors that contribute to minority unrest and hopes for
autonomy or independence. It is likely, however, that this legal
uncertainty has encouraged minority group claims and other
difficulties that have been left to fester by the international
community. The rise of the general international law of human
rights and the consequential erosion of the UN Charter Article 2.7
limitations on matters of domestic concern have provided further
expectations of international support for minority group claims."
Thus, one task of the international community should be to
clarify the right of self-determination in non-colonial situations. The
clearer the law on the subject, the less likely groups will assert
unfounded claims or engage in risky provocations. Reciprocally,
legally supported claims of self-determination may deter egregious
actions by the mother state and will encourage other states to lend
appropriate support to such lawful claims of self-determination.
Although it is for the international community to develop the
international law in this area, one may find the seeds of a solution in
recent developments. It is interesting to compare the international
community's reactions to the events in Chechnya and Kosovo. While
in Kosovo the international community essentially endorsed the
Albanian Kosovar's claims to self-determination, 1 2 in Chechnya the

11.

The U.N. Charter provides:

Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of
any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement
under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application
of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.
U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7.
12.
The UN Security Council explicitly addressed the Kosovo crisis in the
several resolutions adopted under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, both prior and
subsequent to the Spring 1999 NATO attack. See generally S.C. Res. 1160, U.N.
SCOR, 53d Sess., 3868th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1160 (1998); S.C. Res. 1199, U.N.
SCOR, 53d Sess., 3930th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1199 (1998); S.C. Res. 1203, U.N.
SCOR, 53d Sess., 3937th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1203 (1998); S.C. Res. 1244, U.N.
SCOR, 54th Sess., 4011th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (1999). Moreover, statements of
the UN Secretary General after the commencement of the NATO campaign, fell short
of criticism of the NATO actions. Likewise, the Security Council refused to pass a
resolution, proposed by Russia, that would have demanded an immediate cessation of
the use of force by NATO against Yugoslavia. UNITED NATIONS, SECURITY COUNCIL
REJECTS DEMAND FOR CESSATION OF USE OF FORCE AGAINST FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF

YUGOSLAVIA, U.N. Doc. SC/6659 (Mar. 26, 1999).

See also Jonathan I. Charney,
Anticipatory HumanitarianIntervention in Kosovo, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1231,
1246 (1999) (suggesting that the actions of the Security Council as well as statements
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reactions were more muted, essentially focusing on opposition to the
violence used by the Russians against the Chechens without
reference to their possible right to self-determination, within or
13
without Russia.
This distinction may be easily dismissed by experts in
international relations due to the fact that the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (FRY) is a relatively poor country that was run by a
person already indicted by the ICTY for international crimes-Slobodan Milosevic-and his supporters. 14 On the other hand, Russia
despite its troubles was a significant military power with substantial
economic resources. Its government was ostensibly democratic, albeit
at the margins. Furthermore, it is a permanent member of the UN
Security Council, holding the veto right.' 5 These distinctions are
powerful and may suffice. In the past the admitted power of the
Soviet Union, however, did not immunize it from severe pressure by
the international community to open its society. This pressure
substantially contributed to its disintegration and the formation of
several independent states out of its empire.1 6 Thus, despite
differences founded in power politics, the distinction between the
situations in Kosovo and Chechnya may be worth examination.
One can make historical arguments to justify conclusions about
the legality or illegality under international law of the larger states'
sovereignty over these two territories. Both populations have long
histories of serious violent conflicts with the states within which they
were situated.17 Both involve minority populations with major

of the UN Secretary General might have been perceived as the acquiescence of the
United Nations in the NATO intervention in Kosovo); Judith Miller, The Secretary
General Offers Implicit Endorsement of Raids, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1999, at A13.
13.
OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, The Joint Statement of
the High Commissioner on National Minorities of the Organization for Security and

Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Max van der Stoel. the Secretary.General of the
Council of Europe, Walter Schwimmer, and the United Nations High Commissioner for
Human Rights, Mary Robinson, Concern Expressed Over Civilian Situation in
Chechnya (Dec. 8, 1999), at http'J/www.osce.org/news/generate.php3?newsid=379 (last
visited Feb. 21, 2001); OSCE, Annual Report 1999 on OSCE Activities (Nov. 17, 1999).
at http-J/www.osce.org/docslenglish/misclanrep99e.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2001)

(containing a survey of OSCE Missions and other OSCE Field Activities).
14.
Int'l Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Indictment of the
Proscecutor of the Tribunal Against Slobodan Afilosevic et al., May 24, 1999, at
http'Jhwwv.un.org/ictylindictment/englishtmil.ii990524e.htm
(last visited Feb. 21,
2001).
15.
U.N. CHARTER art. 23, para. 1, art. 27.
16.
Agreements Establishing the Commonwealth of Independent States.
Minsk, Dec. 8, 1991 and Alma Alta, Dec. 21, 1991, 31 I.L.M. 138 (1992).

17.

On Kosovo, see, for example, 2 BARBARA JELAWICH. HISTORY OF THE

BALKANS 86-88 (1983); NOEL MALCOLM, Kosovo: A SHORT HISTORY 240-48 (discussing
a series of armed revolts by Kosovo Albanians against the Ottoman government
between 1909 and 1912), 251-58 (discussing the 1912 conquest of Kosovo by the

Serbian army and the ensuing violence against ethnic Albanians by Serbian and
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distinctions that would classify them as a separate people. 18 There
are other distinctions, however, and they may be significant in the
law of self-determination, if it is applicable.
In the case of Kosovo, the Albanian Kosovars had obtained a
degree of autonomy in their province within the Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). After the demise of the SFRY, the
FRY took unilateral steps to eliminate that autonomy and took
draconian steps against the Albanian Kosovars. 19 For several years,

Montenegrin forces), 334-37 (discussing student demonstrations) (1998); Hugh Poulton
& Miranda Vickers, The Kosovo Albanians: Ethnic Confrontation with the Slav State,
in MUSLIM IDENTITY AND THE BALKAN STATE 139, 151-52 (Hugh Poulton & Suha TajiFarouki eds., 1997) (discussing a wave of mass demonstrations by Kosovo Albanians
and a subsequent surge of violence and persecution by Yugoslav authorities in the
early 1980s).
On Chechnya, see, for example, JOHN B. DUNLOP, RUSSIA CONFRONTS CHECHNYA
ROOTS OF A SEPARATIST CONFLICT 24-28 (discussing the continuous warfare from the
mid-1820s to the mid-1850s between Chechens and Russians over the control of the
region), 40-51 (discussing armed resistance by Chechens against both White Russian
and Bolshevik forces during the civil war in Russia in the 1920s and during the 1929.
30 insurrection in Chechnya against the Soviet government) (1998); ANATOL LIEVEN,
CHECHNYA: TOMBSTONE OF RUSSIAN POWER 306-10 (1998).
18.
Both the Kosovo Albanians and Chechens can fairly be characterized as
distinct from their mother countries' majority populations in terms of language,
ethnicity, religion, culture, and social organization. For a relevant discussion with
respect to Kosovo Albanians, see MALCOLM, supra note 17, at 10-40.
For a
corresponding discussion regarding ethnic Chechens, see CARLOTTA GALL & THOMAS
DE WAAL, CHECHNYA: A SMALL VICTORIOUS WAR 20-36 (1997); LIEVEN, supra note 17,
at 324-68. Both ethnic Albanians and Chechens constituted ethnic majorities in
Kosovo and Chechnya, respectively, at the time the present conflicts with the mother
countries arose. Before the displacements prior to and during the NATO airstrike
campaign, the population of Kosovo amounted to almost two million people, with ethnic
Albanians constituting more than 80% of the population (10% Serbs and 8% other
minorities). MERTUS, supra note 6, tbl. 8, at 316; MILAN VUCKOVIC & GORAN NIKOLIC,
STANOVNISTvO KOSOVA U RAZDOBLJU OD 1918 DO 1991 GODINE 108-09 (1996), cited in
MALCOLM, supra note 17, at 330. According to the 1989 Soviet census, the total
population of the Chechen-Ingush Republic was 1.29 million, with Chechens
comprising 57% (30% Russian and 13% Ingush). LIEVEN, supra note 17, at 100. At the
time of the 1989 census, the Chechen-Ingush Republic was apparently one of only three
autonomous Russian republics, out of twenty-one of such constituent republics within
Russia, in which the so-called "titular nationality," a non-Russian ethnic group denoted
in the republic's name, formed the majority of that republic's population. THE
CHECHEN TRAGEDY: WHO IS TO BLAME? 5 (Yu. V. Nikolaev ed., 1996); Lapidus, supra
note 2, at 10. Finally, in both cases, the contested territories constitute quite easily
identifiable physical units within the larger mother country territory. For general
overviews of the geographies of Kosovo and Chechnya, see, respectively, MALCOLM,
supra note 17, at 1-10 and Grant, supra note 10, at 120-21 & n.11.
19.
The long history of serious conflicts between Kosovo Albanians and Serbs
notwithstanding, the genesis of the recent crisis in Kosovo can most directly be traced
back to the 1989 amendments to the constitutions of the republic of Serbia and the
Yugoslav federation. HELSINKI WATCH, INT'L HELSINKI FEDERATION FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS, YUGOSLAVIA: CRISIS IN KOSOVO 10 (1990). Under the 1974 Constitution of
Yugoslavia, which was in force until the final break-up of the Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, Kosovo enjoyed the status of an autonomous province. While
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nevertheless, the Albanian Kosovars tried all peaceful means at their
disposal to seek an accommodation. These efforts were rewarded only
with greater suppression by the Serbs in control of the FRY. 20 The
nonviolent Kosovar actions during this period also demonstrated that
there existed deep and widespread support among the Albanian
Kosovars for efforts to preserve their self-determination. 2 ' This led
ultimately to the foundation of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA)
that only then sought independence from the FRY and used violence
to seek that goal. 22 Those efforts were met with violence and greater

Article 1 of the 1974 Constitution stated that the two autonomous provinces of Kosovo
and Vojvodina were "constituent parts of the Socialist Republic of Serbia," the two
provinces had their own direct representation on the federal level, their own
constitutions, and broad autonomy in the economic sphere. Constitution of the
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Feb. 21, 1974. reprinted in YUGOSLAVIA
THROUGH DOCUMENTS: FROM ITS CREATION TO ITS DISSOLUTION 224, 225 (Snezana
Trifinovska ed., 1994). For a comprehensive discussion of the evolution of Kosovo's
provincial autonomy status and a detailed analysis of the 1974 constitutional
provisions related to the status of Kosovo, see Sami Repishti, The Evolutin of Kosovais
Autonomy Within the Yugoslav ConstitutionalFramework, in STUDIES ON KOSOVA 195
(Arshi Pipa & Sami Repishti eds., 1984). The 1989 constitutional amendments
authored by Serbia effectively stripped Kosovo of its autonomous status. Prior to the
adoption of the amendments, the government of Serbia and the federal government of
Yugoslavia initiated a sweeping purge of ethnic Albanians in the province, involving
mass arrests and detentions, political and economic intimidation, and widespread
police violence. For an account of serious human rights abuses perpetrated by the
government of Serbia and the Yugoslav federal government prior to the formal
ratification of the constitutional amendments, see HELSINKI WATCH. supra, at 17-41.
20.
From 1989 onward, the Serbian and Yugoslav governments carried out a
policy of brutal and systematic suppression of the remnants of Kosovo's provincial
autonomy in the political, economic, social, and cultural spheres. The execution of that
policy involved widespread and significant human rights abuses. MALCOLM, supra
note 17, at 344-53.
21.
In 1991 Kosovo Albanians managed to organize a referendum on the status
of Kosovo in which a reported 87% of voters took part, 99% of whom voted in favor of
declaring Kosovo a sovereign and independent republic. MALCOLM, supra note 17, at
347. In the May 24, 1992, elections for the Kosovo republican parliament and
government, which were deemed illegal by the Serbian government, a reported 721,534
out of 821,588 registered voters participated. MERTUS, supra note 6, at 301.
Since the eruption of the crisis precipitated by the constitutional crisis in 1989, the
political culture mobilized the Kosovo Albanians to take increasingly sophisticated
actions involving boycotts of official elections, the emergence of political parties, and
the establishment of "shadow" institutions of a separate republic under the leadership
of Ibrahim Rugova and the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK). E.g., MALCOLM, supra
note 17, at 347-48; Poulton & Vickers, supra note 17, at 155.56. For an overview of the
institutions of the parallel Albanian system in the spheres of education, health care,
taxation, and information services, see Veniamin Karakostanoglou. The Kosoto
Question: Starting& Concluding the Yugoslav Crisis?,an BALEAN CURRENT1%S: STUDIES
IN THE HISTORY, CULTURE AND SOCIETY OF A DIVIDED LAND 47, 55-58 (Lawrence A.
Tritle ed., 1998).
22.
Commentators generally date the emergence of the KLA as a significant
player in the Kosovo crisis to the 1996-1997 incidents that included shooting and
bombing of Serb officials and police when the previously unidentified Kosovo
Liberation Army (KLA) openly claimed responsibility. E.g., MALCOLMI. supra note 17,
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suppression by the FRY. 23 After efforts by the United Nations and

NATO appeared to fail to resolve the crisis, 24 NATO unilaterally took
action to protect the Albanian Kosovars. 25 This ultimately resulted in
a UN Security Council sanctioned occupation and administration of
Kosovo that operated as if Kosovo was de facto independent of the

FRY. 26

In contrast, Chechnya's path to the declaration of independence
was a unilateral process, devoid of any efforts aimed at some
negotiated accommodation. 27 It might be plausible to conclude that
Chechnya managed to secede, de facto, without a major use of force
between the time that the Soviet Union collapsed and a relatively

at 354-55; MERTUS, supra note 6, at 307. Initially, both the membership and the public
support of the KLA were limited. By the summer of 1998, however, the KLA forces
exercised control over approximately one-third of Kosovo and appeared to have gained
strong popular support among the Kosovo Albanians. R. Jeffrey Smith, Kosovo Rebel
Leaders Hard to Find; U.S. Efforts to Get Them to Peace Talks Unsuccessful, WASH.
POST, June 28, 1998, at A25.
23.
According to the U.S. Department of State, the
organized
counterinsurgency operations by the Milosevic regime against the KLA began in early
1998. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, ERASING HISTORY: ETHNIC CLEANSING IN KOSOVO 5 (May
1999). In March 1999 the policy of the Milosevic regime shifted from selective
targeting of localities suspected of supporting the KLA toward a more systematic effort
to "ethnically cleanse" the entire province. Id. at 5-6. See also Charney, supra note 12,
at 1245-46 & n.44.
24.
Charney, supra note 12, at 1233 (discussing the involvement of the UN
Security Council in the Kosovo matter prior to the NATO intervention). See also the
sources cited supra in note 12.
25.
The NATO airstrike campaign commenced on March 24, 1999 without the
Chapter VII authorization by the UN Security Council. For a discussion of the legal
implications of the NATO intervention under established public international law, see
Charney, supranote 12, at 1232-38.
26.
In its Resolution 1244, the UN Security Council authorized the United
Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo to administer the territory on
behalf of the international community. S.C. Res. 1244, supranote 12, para. 10.
27.
Chechnya unilaterally declared itself independent from both the Russian
Federation and the still-existing Soviet Union on November 1, 1991, following a
Dudayev-orchestrated coup and the republican presidential and parliamentary
elections of October 27, 1991. GALL & DE WALL, supra note 18, at 98-99. The elections
were chaotic and their legitimacy was questioned by some commentators. DUNLOP,
supra note 17, at 113-15; GALL & DE WALL, supra note 18, at 99; Emil A. Payin &
Arkady A. Popov, Chechnya-From Past to Present, at http://www.amina.com/article/
history.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2001). Subsequently, the Russian parliament issued a
resolution declaring the elections in Chechnya invalid, but a haphazard military
operation by Russian Interior Ministry troops ended in a humiliating withdrawal from
Chechnya on November 9, 1991. DUNLOP, supra note 17, at 115-21; GALL & DE WALL,
supra note 18, at 101. By the end of December 1991 the Soviet Union had officially
dissolved. For the next two years, Chechnya was essentially left to its own devices,
making it possible-at least for practical purposes-to secede de facto. See generally
Lapidus, supra note 2 (discussing the evolution of the Russian response to the crisis in
Chechnya).
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stable Russian government emerged two years later.2 8 During this
period of de facto independence, the Chechen government failed to
build any viable institutions of an independent state, and instead
turned to criminal sources of support. 29
During that period,
Chechnya became a center of criminal activities of extraordinary
proportions. 30 In the end, it is even hard to conclude that the
positions of the regime represented the popular will of the Chechen
people.3 1 The Russian response was indeed violent and violations of
international humanitarian law can easily be attributed to both
sides. 32 While there was international condemnation of the armed
force used, especially by the Russian military, 33 no serious
international support for Chechen self-determination is evident to
date. One has the sense that the international community accepted
the view that Chechnya should remain a part of Russia. Even the

28.

For an account of the major developments in the "Chechen Revolution" of

1991, see DUNLOP, supra note 17, at 85-123; GALL & DE %VAAL, supra note 18, at 76102. While Dudayev's National Guard played a key role in the insurrection, it appears
that the Chechen de facto secession without a significant use of force was really the
result of a power vacuum created during the collapse of the Soviet Union. In actuality,
Chechnya took advantage of the chaos resulting from the intense power struggle
between Yeltsin and Gorbachev and the political turmoil in Russia on the eve of the
dissolution of the Soviet Union. E.g., DUNLOP, supra note 17, at 91-92, 100-102, 11520; Payin & Popov, supra note 27, at http:/www.amina.com/articlelhistory.html.
29.
E.g., DUNLOP, supra note 17, at 120-34; GALL & DE WAAL, supra note 18, at
124-36.
30.
Id.
31.
While it is arguable whether the November 1991 elections truly reflected
the will of the people, it is apparent that the surge in anti-Russian sentiment following
the November 8-9 abortive intervention dramatically contributed to the rise of the
popular support of Dudayev. Any initial public support for the Dudayev regime.
however, dramatically dissipated between 1992 and 1994. DUNLOP, supra note 17, at
114-15 (commenting on the official results of the October 1991 elections in Chechnya);
GALL & DE WAAL, supra note 18, at 101 (noting the increase in popular support behind
Dudayev as the result of the Russian military threat), 103-09 (noting the widespread
dissent against the Dudayev regime); Lapidus, supranote 2, at 16.
32.
For a discussion of serious human rights violations by both sides of the
conflict, see Svante E. Cornell, International Reactions to Massive Human Rights
Violations: The Case of Chechnya, EUR.-ASIA STUD., Jan. 1, 1999, at 85, 1999 WVL
31681742.
33.
See supra note 13 and accompanying text. See also Steve Goldstein,
Russia's Crushing Attack Brings a Stern Rebuke from Christopher, PHILADELPHIA
INQUIRER, Jan. 13, 1995, at Al, LEXIS, News Library, PHI File; Steven Greenhouse.
U.S. Human Rights Study Turns Heat on Russia, I,'rL HERALD TRiB., Feb. 2, 1995,
LEXIS, News Library, IHT File; Norman Kempster, U.S. Finds Way to Criticize
Russian Acts in Chechnya Diplomacy, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 12. 1995, at A9; Taras
Lariokhin, Russia's Moves in Chechnya Lawful Yet Wrong, Denmarl Says, TASS
(Moscow), Dec. 14, 1994, LEXIS, News Library, TASS File; Alessandra Stanley, Russia
Delivers Mixed Signals on its Military Campaign, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 1994, at A12;
Craig R. Whitney, Europeans Offer to Help Russia Seck Peace in Secessionist War, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 4, 1995, at A6.
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issue of Chechen minority rights has not surfaced as an international
issue.
Perhaps there are distinctions between these two situations of
legal significance that, in part, guided the behavior of the
international community. On the one hand, the Albanian Kosovar's
actions assured the international community that all efforts at
peaceful settlement of the disputes had been exhausted and that, to
the extent possible, the claims of self-determination represented 'the
Furthermore,
will of the majority of Albanian Kosovars.
independence was sought after all other solutions proved unavailable
and armed force was used only as a last resort. In contrast, the
situation in Chechnya quickly escalated to the use of force and a
claim to independence without significant evidence that the Chechen
forces represented the will of the Chechen people.
While it is indeed possible that the facts recounted above are
distorted due to limited access to information, they represent the
facts generally understood by the international community. 34 These
facts thus provide the operative information that may have
contributed to different reactions by this community to these
superficially parallel situations.
If this is true, information may be derived from these two events
that reflect developments in international law that enable a people to
attain the support of the international community for actions based
on a claim of self-determination in the non-colonial context:
1.

2.

3.

a bona fide exhaustion of peaceful methods of resolving
the dispute between the government and the minority
group claiming an unjust denial of internal selfdetermination, including efforts to use the good offices of
other states and intergovernmental organizations;
a demonstration that the persons making the group's
self-determination claim represent the will of the
majority of that group; and
a resort to the use of force and a claim to independence is
taken only as a means of last resort.

This is not to say that the Chechens do not deserve the benefits
of the law of self-determination, but absent the above evidence it
appears unlikely that the international community generally will
recognize such efforts and support the claim. This may be one of the

See supra notes 17, 18, 27. See also Jeff Berliner, Breakaway Chechen
34.
Republic Wracked by Protests in Southern Russia, UPI, Apr. 1, 1992, LEXIS, News
Library, UPI File; Richard D. Lyons, Explosive Mix in Chechnya: History, Hatredand
Oil, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1994, at A14; Inga Saffron, Gangster Style Reigns in
Breakaway State: Lawlessness a Matter of National Pride in Chechnya, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Nov. 30, 1994, at 35A; Vladimir Yemelyanenko, Russia.Chechnya: A
ForcedLove Affair, MOSCOW NEWS, Nov. 18, 1992, 1992 WL 8382124.
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lessons to be learned from the concurrent events in Chechnya and
Kosovo. If these lessons become better known, others seeking self.
determination may be guided by them. Since the bona fide
exhaustion of all means to find a resolution of the dispute and
democratic values is critical, it may help to avoid the escalation of the
dispute to violence and undesirable injuries to persons and property.
With these conclusions in mind, we might examine the
somewhat different situation in East Timor. While Indonesia was not
a distant colonial state in the classical sense, the situation has close
parallels to the colonial past. In that situation, Indonesia recently
had obtained control over East Timor by conquest. 35 International
disapprobation was severe and continuing.3 6 On these grounds alone
perhaps, the doctrine of self-determination based on decolonization
might apply directly. Nevertheless, if we view East Timor through
the lens used for Kosovo and Chechnya, we find that a territoriallybased identifiable population sought self-determination. 37 While
violence was used by some to obtain their goals shortly after the
Indonesian conquest, 38 the most salient efforts were through domestic
and international means in an effort to reach the goal of self-

35.
See generally Thomas D. Grant, East Timor, the U.M System, and
Enforcing Non-Recognition in International Law, 33 VAND. J. TRANSNATr'L L. 273
(2000); Natalie S. Klein, MultilateralDisputes and the Doctrine of Necessary Partiesin
the East Timor Case, 21 YALE J. INT'L L. 305 (1996); Manooher Mofidi, Prudential
Timorousness in the Case Concerning East Timor (Portugal?. Australia).7 J. IN-rL L
& PRAC. 35 (1998); Jani Purnawanty, Various Perspectives in Understandingthe East
Timor Crisis, 14 TEMP. INT'L & CoMP. L.J. 61 (2000).

36.
S.C. Res. 389, U.N. SCOR, 31st Sess., 1914th mtg., paras. 1-2. at 18, U.N.
Doc. S/INFI32 (1977) (urging all States to "respect the territorial integrity of East
Timor" and calling upon Indonesia to withdraw). See also Grant, supra note 35, at 27678 (reporting that the United Nations never recognized Indonesia's claim over East
Timor). Australia and the United States arguably acquiesced in Indonesian control
over East Timor. Purnawanty, supra note 35, at 65; Gerry J. Simpson. Judging the
East Timor Dispute: Self-Determination at the International Court of Justice. 17
HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 323, 325 n.10 (1994).
37.
See Mark Dodd, Revolutionary Front Turns Bach to Mainstream, SYDNEY
MORNING HERALD, May 16, 2000, 2000 WL 21023300 (noting the plan of FRETILIN,
the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor, to reform into a -properly
constituted political party" with an estimated 15,000 members); Jill Jolliffe, A
Government in the Bush, AUST. FIN. REV., Sept. 24, 1999, at 12 (providing a history of
East Timor's resistance fighters); Dom Rotheroe, Rebels With a Cause. GEOGRAPHICAL
MAG., Dec. 1, 1999, at 34 CWith a huge local support. for 24 years FRETILIN's
guerrillas-FALINTIL[,] or the Armed Forces of the National Liberation of East
Timor[-]relentlessly fought for freedom and in 1988 the National Council of Maubere
Resistance (CNRM) formed, gathering together all those opposed to the occupatiomn.").
Prior to the Indonesian invasion there were attempts by the East Timorese to
secure their independence from Portugal. Some of the political groups remained active
while Indonesia occupied East Timor. Roger S. Clark, East Timor, Indonesia, and the
International Community, 14 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 75, 79.80 (2000); Purnawanty,
supra note 35, at 63.
38.
See generally Rotheroe, supranote 37.
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determination, not necessarily full independence. 39 The appeals were
denied by Indonesia but they finally bore fruit through UN efforts
during the period after President Suharto was overthrown for
As a consequence, a plebiscite was held
unrelated reasons. 40
41
resulting in an overwhelming vote for independence from Indonesia.
The massive violence committed by Indonesian backed militia forces
on East Timor hardened the international community's support for
East Timor's independence and resulted in UN administration of the
territory and substantial support from other countries. 42 The claim of
self-determination was indeed successful in a situation paralleling
that of Kosovo and consistent with the three factors present there:
exhaustion of peaceful methods of resolution, demonstrated support

Concerning East Timor (Port. v. Aust.), 1995 I.C.J. 90 (June 30); Michael
39.
Creadon & Michael Shari, Prize Before Peace: A Priest and a Rebel Get the Nobel, But
the Conflict in East Timor is Still Unresolved, TIME INT'L, Oct. 21, 1996, at 30, 1996
WL 12731876; FactsAbout East Timor, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Sept. 20, 1999, 1999
WL 25109316 ("East Timor's demands for independence gained momentum with the
1996 award of the Nobel Peace Prize jointly to independence campaigner Jose RamosHorta and the bishop of Dili, Carlos Felipe Ximenes Belo.").
40.
See Agreement Between the Republic of Indonesia and the Portuguese
Republic on the Question of East Timor (May 5, 1999), at http://www.un.org/peace/
etimor99/agreement/agreeFrameEng01.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2001) (allowing the
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whether the East Timorese accepted or rejected a special autonomy for East Timor
within the Republic of Indonesia); S.C. Res. 1246, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 4013th mtg.
para. 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1246 (1999) (establishing the United Nations Mission in East
Timor (UNAMET) to oversee the popular consultation); S.C. Res. 1262, U.N. SCOR,
54th Sess., 4038th mtg. para. 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1262 (1999) (extending the mandate
of UNAMET).
41.
"UNAMET registered 451,792 potential voters among the population of
over 800,000 in East Timor and abroad. On voting day, August 30, 1999, some 98 per
cent of registered voters went to the polls deciding by a margin of 94,388 (21.5 per cent)
to 344,580 (78.5 per cent) to reject the proposed autonomy and begin a process of
transition towards independence."
United Nations, East Timor-UNTAET
Background, at http:llwww.un.org/peace/etimorlUntaetB.htm (last visited Feb. 3,
2001). See also UNITED NATIONS, PEOPLE OF EAST TIMOR REJECT PROPOSED SPECIAL
AUTONOMY, EXPRESS WISH TO BEGIN TRANSITION TO INDEPENDENCE, SECRETARYGENERAL INFORMS SECURITY COUNCIL, U.N. Doc. SG/SM/7119 SC/6722 (Sept. 3, 1999).
42.
S.C. Res. 1264, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 4045th mtg. para. 3, U.N. Doc.
S/RES11264 (1999) (authorizing the establishment of a multinational force); S.C. Res.
1272, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 4057th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1272 (1999) (establishing
the United Nations Transitional Administration to East Timor (UNTAET)); S.C. Res.
1319, U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess., 4195th mtg. pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1319 (2000)
(expressing concern about the large number of East Timor refugees in West Timor);
Report of the Secretary-General,TransitionalAdministration in East Timor, U.N. Doc.
S/2000/53 (Jan. 26, 2000) (discussing the activities of UNTAET and developments in
East Timor), at http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/docs/0026162e.htm (last visited Feb. 3,
2001); Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to
InternationalLaw, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 102, 105-08 (2000); John R. Schmertz, Jr. & Mike
Meier, EU Imposes Sanctions on Indonesia Because of East Timor Situation, INT'L L.
UPDATE, Oct. 1999, LEXIS, News Library, ILAWUP File (noting how the European
Union imposed restrictive measures on Indonesia).
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of the population for independence, and force used as a last resort-in
this case by outside forces to prevent the Indonesian-backed militia
from thwarting the peacefully asserted will of the East Timorese
population.
This approach is very much in line with the views of the
Canadian Supreme Court when it was called upon to examine the
doctrine of self-determination in regard to the potential claim to
secede from the Canadian Confederation by Quebec Province. 43 Since
the opinion was written in the context of the Canadian constitutional
structure and the Supreme Court is an organ of the central
government it may not be considered completely neutral on the
subject. Nevertheless, the Court resorted to international law
authorities and produced an opinion that closely tracks the behavior
of third states in the Chechnya, Kosovo, and East Timor situations
discussed above. 44 This opinion provides further support for the view
that the doctrine of self-determination has a role in the post colonial
period and that exhaustion of peaceful settlement efforts,
demonstrated representation of the minority group's will, and the use
of armed force as a last resort are prerequisites to such claims outside
of the decolonization context.

43.
44.

Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] S.C.R. 217.
[1998] S.C.R. 293-96.

